The Effect of War on Currency and Deposits by Charles R. Whittlesey
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Effect of War on Currency and Deposits





Chapter Title: Monetary Expansion And The Problem Of Inflation
Chapter Author: Charles R. Whittlesey
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5871
Chapter pages in book: (p. 32 - 42)appreciably altered by a recognition that existing methods may themselves
be highly expansionist. The importance customarily attached to subjective
interpretations helps to explain why the quantitative factors mentioned above
have generally been given so little emphasis.
MONETARY EXPANSION AND THE PROBLEM OF INFLATION21
A sudden and pronounced increase in the volume of circulating medium
always gives rise to the fear of inflation. It has become customary to discuss
the problem of inflation in the present war, however, not in terms of the
quantity of money but of incomes and expenditures, or more especially,
of consumer incomes in relation to the supply of consumer goods and
services. The explanation, briefly,is that enlarged expenditures by the
government lead to an expansion of incomes but, because they are directed
toward the production of war materials, do not lead to a corresponding
increase in the supply of goods and services available for purchases by the
public. The result is the emergence of a so-called inflationary gap, an excess
of potential demand over potential supply. The former is represented by
consumer income and the latter by consumer goods and services available
at the prevailing level of prices.
Tile Bases of inflation
The question here is how the growth of circulating medium is related to
this familiar explanation of the causes of inflation. The relationship would
seem to rest principally on two considerations. In the iirst place, when
funds disbursed by the government are obtained by borrowing newly
created deposits from banks, there is no offsetting reduction in total means
payment at the disposalthe public. Consequendy expenditures by the
public are presumably larger than they would be if the governmeiit had
acquired the sums it spends by taxation or borrowing out of income. in the
second place, the increase in total circulating medium maintains the stream
of income and expenditure in an inflated condition through subsequent
exchanges. Thus the expansionist effect persists: the continued growth of
circulating medium contributes to a sustained rise in income.
It is often implied that taxation or borrowing from the public will reduce
27 Note by Clarence Heer, Director: For the benefit of. those readers who are not acquainted
with the plan of this series, it should be emphasized that this paper is primarily a study of war-
time changes in the volume of currency and deposits and their relation to the problem of infla-
tion. This restriction in scope is partly because of limitations of space and partly because plans
call for the treatment elsewhere of other aspects of the problem of war finance. Any appearance
of over-emphasis or omission that may result from this arbitrary division of subject matter will,
it is be remedied through the publication of other papers in the series.
32the inflationary potential by an amount equal to the income absorbed by
these means. This conclusion involves the implicit assumption that sums
collected from the public are taken out of what would otherwise have been
spent for consumption. If, instead of reducing consumption by the full
amount collected by the government, the public cuts down on its savings,
the inflationary gap is reduced by something less than the amount trans..
ferred to the government. The net effect of taxation, compulsory savings,
and borrowing out of income is influenced by any repercussions they may
have upon total income and on consumption and private investment.
The description of the inflationary gap as frequently presented is open
to the further objection that it assumes that any excess of income over
civilian supply which is not drained off by such means as taxation and
borrowing will necessarily be spent, and therefore operate to raise the level
of prices. In making this assumption, it identifies potential demand (the total
of retained income) with actual demand (expenditures) for consumer goods
and services. No such identity as this assumes is admissible.
In recent months the public has held larger amounts of cash idle instead
of employing all of the excess of income to compete for the scarce supply
of goods. To a considerable extent people have been prevented, as by
"freezing" and rationing, from spending their income fQr the goods they
would be willing to buy. Potential demand may be restricted either by the
removal of income through borrowing and taxing or by its immobilization.
The latter may result from compulsion, as in the case of general rationing,
or from voluntary choice, as when income receivers prefer to hold money
rather than spend it for goods that are available. Both the reduction of
retained income and the immobilization of that which is retained operates
to restrain the upward drive of prices. Viewed in this light, hoarding of
money may be regarded as an anti-inflationary influence, as long, that is,
as the funds remain idle.
The latter qualification brings out one of the main difliculties in the
present situation. As long as the building up of idle cash balances con-
tinues, this serves to restrain inflation. By operating to reduce consumer
expenditures below the total of retained consumer income it helps to bring
the level of effective demand down toward the level of available supply.
But with a change in circumstances or expectations such as might attend
the cessation of war, cash balances now idle might become active. In that
case expenditures could proceed at a rate in excess of current net income.
The effect might be to accentuate any inflationary tendency then existing
and thus to aggravate an upward movement of prices; under opposite
conditions it might serve to resist a downward movement.
The potentialities inherent in a large volume of idle balances constitute
33a dynamIc element of considerable while the possibility of
exercising some degree of control over this latent force represents an
important strategic problem in the battle against inflation. At present the
chief means of influencing these liquid funds are rationing and other forms
of direct economic control. To the extent that we are able to check infla-
tion, we may succeed in evolving techniques that will be useful later in
coping with problems of deflation.
Like so many other economic phenomena, the accumulation of idle
balances is to be judged only in the light of its alternatives and the conditions
within which it takes place. During the 1930'sitwas viewed with distinct
disfavor since expenditures at that time were inadequate for the attainment
of full employment. Today circumstances are very different: instead of
concern over a lack of spending there is fear of too great spending. While
hoarding fails to contribute to the war effort as would the lending of the
hoarded funds to the government, it is clearly free from the immediate
inflationary dangers involved in the competition of funds for a dwindling
store of consumer goods. The significance of these large idle balances in
the period after the war will depend to a great extent upon the future course
of consumer income and civilian supply. Itis likely, however, that for
some time after the war the task of preventing the sudden release of these
reserves of purchasing power will be one of the major problems of monetary
and fiscal policy.
Characteristics of Recent Price Behavior28
An increase in the volume of circulating medium is of most general concern
in relation to changes in the structure of prices. At one time it was commonly
accepted that the sole and certain cause of price inflation was an undue
expansion of the circulating medium. While there is less agreement now
than formerly as to the exact relationship between a change in circulating
medium and a change in prices, the existence of a connection between
the two phenomena is generally accepted. A comparison of changes in
circulation and in wholesale prices is presented in Chartwhichshows
movements that occurred between June 1939 and December iw as well as
during the period of the first World War.
In both war periods the volume of circulating medium and the level
of wholesale prices moved upward. The two periods are, nevertheless, in
sharp contrast. Despite a relatively greater expansion in the circulating
medium during the present war, the rise in the index of wholesale prices has
28 It should be borne in mind that indexes measuring price changes are less representative in
wartime. This is true for the wholesale price index as well as for the cost of living index. Com-

















been much less than it was in the previous war period. During the last
war prices increased more rapidly, part of the time much more rapidly, than
the volume of circulating medium. In the present war wholesale prices have
increased much less than the circulating medium.
The contrast between the two periods was particularly marked in the
first year of the present war when the quantity of circulating medium
increased substantially with relatively little change in prices. From 1940
on prices rose considerably even though they still lagged behind the increase
in circulating medium. In both periods the correspondence between the
growth of circulating medium and the rise in prices became greater as the
war progressed, in the last war through a slowing down of the rate at
which prices increased, and in this war through a speeding up of the rate
relative to the growth in circulating medium.
A number of factors help to explain why prices have failed to rise by
as much as might be expected. in the light of the experience of the last war
period or of the recent growth in circulating medium:
a. The existence of a relatively large amount of unemployed capacity at
the start of the present war
.35
CHART 4—WHOLESALE PRICES AND THE CIRCULATING MEDIUM,
WORLD WARS I AND a
(CumulatedAnnual Percentage Increases)
WORLDWAR $ WORLD WAR II
PERCENT PERCENT
100
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.43
a Basedon Federal Reserve Bulletin and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Banking Studies (1941) Table 29. Dates are for June 30. The
extension of the circulatinR medium curve for the period June to December
1942 may be subject to some distortion because of seasonal factors.b. Certain banking developments that have tended to retard the activity
of demand deposits29
c.Reduction in the volume of consumer and other types of credit
d. Restrictions on spending, of which rationing is the most important
e.Increase in the proportion of the circulating medium diverted to the
use of the government.
It is important to recognize that some of these factors, which were very
important earlier in this war, are of little or no significance at the present
time. Only the last two seem now to be capable of substantial extension.
Because of the number and variety of independent and extraneous factors
influencing the volume of both money and trade, the money supply, however
this is defined, has lost whatever usefulness it may once have possessed as
an accurate guide to the behavior of commodity prices. This is not to deny
that it is, nevertheless, an important factor in the determination of prices
and the distribution of income.
The spread of price inflation through different sectors of the economy
has not been uniform. Table 6 indicates the manner in which the upward
push of prices was reflected in the cost of living in different cities through-
out the country. From June 1939, the month chosen as a base, to Decem-
29 Among these developments may be mentioned the imposition of higher service charges, the
practice of requiring larger average balances for a given amount of services performed, and the
elimination or limitation of time deposits by many banks. As a result of the latter change, a
large volume of slow moving deposits that would otherwise appear as time deposits are now
classified as demand deposits. As may be seen from the accompanying charts, the contrast shown
in Chart 4 is not greatly modified when time deposits are added to the figures for circulating
medium. The curve for the combined total is still appreciably below the price curve in the period
of the last war, and above it for the present war. The principal change to be detected is that in
the present period the index for circulating medium plus time deposits is somewhat closer to the
price index than is the index for circulating medium alone.
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Inthe last war the introduction of the Federal Reserve brought about changes within the bank-
ing system which were probably of a character to increase rather than reduce the activity of de-
posits. This would appear to have been the tendency of the improved system of clearing and





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.her 1942 the cost of living for the entire United States rose22 percent
but the rise for the selected cities shown in this table varied from a low
of 19 percent to a high of 25 percent. While this difference is perhaps not
extreme, the change that took place month by month was somewhat less
even. Thus during a particular month when the reported rise in one of the
cities was 3 percent, in another city there was a drop of nearly i percent.
However, it is to be noted that these discrepancies tended to be overcome in
the course of time.
For reasons not wholly attributable to monetary factors:, very pronounced
differences are to be detected in the behavior of the various elements entering
into the computed cost of living. Without exception the greatest rise
occurred in the cost of food and the smallest in rent. However, the increase
in food costs was much greater in some states than in others. The cost of
food in the Pacific Coast centers rose substantially more than the average
for the country, and in Minneapolis considerably less than the average.
Rents remained practically stable in some localities, notably New York
and Washington. In other cities, among them Birmingham and Seattle,
rents rose markedly until about the middle of 1942.Atthat time the ceiling
imposed on rents by the OPA brought about a reaction which was very
pronounced in these and certain other cities.. Differences in the behavior
of rents .are more marked than in either clothing or food. In some instances,
but by no means in all, these irregularities reflect differences in the relative
level of rents at the beginning of the period. The rise in rents was not only
less than that of either of the other maj or components of the cost of living
but in addition was the least uniform among the different cities. The increase
in cost of clothing showed the greatest degree of uniformity. Over the period
as a whole, the greatest rise in price of clothing occurred in Washington,
and the least in Chicago.
Regional differences in the way various prices have moved are probably
influenced by such factors as the scale of defense expenditures, the movement
of defense workers into some areas, and the transfer of Japanese truck
farmers away from the West Coast. At any event, the irregularities in the
pattern of price rise appear to bear little relation to these regional differences
with respect to increases or decreases in the volume of circulating medium.
The Problem of Liquid Resources
The increase in the volume of circulating medium constitutes one sector of
the growth in liquid claims to which reference was made earlier. It is obvious
that all this circulating medium belongs to someone. Even though a con-
siderable part may temporarily be held more or less idle, there is never-
theless a larger volume of funds at the immediate disposal of the public.
38These funds represent meanspayment that could, granted certain condi-
tions, be thrown on the market at any moment, thereby altering substantially
the flow of expenditures and income.
In addition to liquid resources in this immediately disposable form, large
groups of claims exist that are, nominally at least, quickly convertible into
cash. These include a considerable variety of short-term obligations such
as time deposits and various Treasury securities. The increase in total liquid
resources during the calendar years 1940 to 1942was billion,or nearly
percentof the amount in existence at the start of the period.
The major items included in this increase were demand deposits, cur-
rency, and government obligations. The growth in time deposits was neg-
ligible, amounting to only a little over a billion dollars as against nearly
$32 billion for currency and demand deposits and approximately $39 billion
for Treasury obligations. The increase in the amount of government secur-
ities held by individuals took the form chiefly of war savings bonds, while
the increase in the amount held by business enterprises was principally in
the form of tax notes and marketable securities.30 Mutual savings banks and
insurance companies bought chiefly longer-term issues, while about three-
fifths of the acquisitions by non-financial corporations in the first two war
loan drives were concentrated in one-year maturities. The liquid resources
of the Treasury and federal agencies and trust funds rose approximately
$13billionduring the period,well over half of the increase being in currency
and deposits and the rest in Treasury obligations, chiefly of the longer-term
issues.
In the three calendar years 1940 to 1942,then,individuals became l.arge
holders of redeemable Treasury obligations and non-financial business enter-
prises became large holders of marketable Treasury securities, particularly
those of relatively short maturities. Both groups added large amounts to
their liquid resources in the form of currency and deposits. While the in-
crease in liquid resources held by various government accounts was large
relative to the amount held at the beginning of the period, their total was
much smaller than that held by either of the other two categories of owners.
By far the largest part of the liquid resources belonging to individuals
represents income receipts not spent on consumption, taxation, or long-term
investment. This is conspicuously true of liquid resources in the form of
war savings bonds. As was noted earlier, income retained in the form of idle
balances does not exert any direct influence on prices. The existence of a
large volume of obligations payable on demand (as in the case of demand
30 Whether marketable Federal obligations should be viewed as liquid resources is somewhat
open to question. They are included here on the grounds that they are so regarded by the holders
and that it is the present policy of the Federal Reserve Banks to guarantee their liquidity.
39deposits and war savings bonds) or after a short period of time (as in the
case of time deposits and short-term Treasury obligations) inevitably raises
the question, however, of the possibility of strain in case an exceptionally
high proportion of the claims are liquidated at any given time. The basis
for the present concern over these liquid claims lies in the clear fact that
their volume is not only higher than ever before in our history, 'but is
rapidly expanding.
Fear of the inflationary consequences of excessive liquid resources arises
primarily out of the possibility that they may contribute to a sudden and
abnormal increase in demand for commodities. The release into circulation
of currency and deposits previously held idle would clearly add to the
current demand for goods. The inflationary effects of this would be greatly
aggravated if holders of time deposits, war savings bonds, and other short-
term assets were to try to convert these claims into cash and the cash into
goods.3' This would, of course, place pressure upon the obligors because of
the necessity of providing cash. A sudden cashing of liquid claims would
presumably lead to a sharp increase in the rapidity of monetary circulation.
And if the funds to meet the increased demand for cash were obtained by
borrowing from the banks the effect would be to expand the volume of
circulating medium.
If the expansionist possibilities of liquid balances were to materialize
during a period of boom, as conceivably they might, they would operate to
accentuate the boom and perhaps to induce inflation. If they were to occur
during a period of unemployment, as is also conceivable, they would tend to
promote recovery. It seems probable. that the future effects of these liquid
funds will depend in considerable part upon their distributionas,for
example, between corporations and individuals or among groups with high
or iow incomes. While we know that substantial changes have occurred,
our knowledge either of the present ownership of liquid assets or the
probable behavior of different ownership groups is extremely limited. A
further factor that may be expected to affect the future behavior of these
liquid resources is the form in which they are held, e.g., whether as cir-
culating medium, redeemable government obligations, or as short-term or
long-term marketable securities.
The newest and at th.e same time one of the largest of the items con-
stituting the group of liquid resources is war savings bonds. The fact that
their redeemability on demand makes war savings bonds a close substitute
for cash is presumably an important element in their attractiveness to in-
31Themagnitude of this inflationary effect would depend on the volume of goods and services
these accumulated liquid assets could command at the time of their conversion into goods. If
the previous price rise had been very great the value, in real terms, of these accumulated savings
might have shrunk very considerably, so that the inflationary effect would be small.
40vestors. On the other hand, the redeemability feature raises a perplexing
problem with respect to future government financing, since it implies that the
Treasury may be called upon at any moment to obtain large sums of money
with which to m.eet sudden increases in the demand for redemption. Large
floating debts have been known in the past but never before has so large a
debt been subject to payment on presentation. Indeed, the present case is
highly exceptional since, apart from occasional issues of paper currency,
governments have seldom made use of demand obligations.
The extent of the effect will depend, of course, not on the existence of
the right of bondholders to demand cash but on the extent to which that
right is exercised. The desire to convert into cash is not by any manner of
means constant but is determined by conditions certain to vary from time
to time. Among these conditions are the need for cash to maintain existing
standards of living, as in the case of an increase in unethployment, the desire
for cash to support a rise in living standards, and fear of a loss in the value of
the monetary unit.
Future policy might be directed toward lessening the incentive to present
bonds for redemption. A continuation or extension of the policy of ration-
ing, for example, would reduce the desire of individuals to cash in their
bonds through restricting their freedom to use the money they would get
if they did so. Likewise, policies that would prevent unemployment would,
at the same time, limit the demand for redemption by reducing the need of
individuals to convert their liquid assets into cash.82
Probably the most significant consideration with respect to war savings
32 It is necessary to avoid the temptation to digress on aspects of this subject which are fiscal
rather than monetary in character. Certain points may, however, be noted briefly in passing. A
period of unemployment with rising demand for redemption could have the curious effect of
enabling the debt to be reduced at the expense of people who would otherwise be on relief. This
would be the result if individuals were required to liquidate any war savings bonds they might
own before becoming eligible for subsistence payments by the government. Even without a means
test such as this presumes, many individuals would doubtless use up part or all of their savings
in the form of government bonds before applying for relief. It is reasonably certain that any
strain imposed upon the Treasury by demand for redemption in a period of rising unemploy-
ment would reduce in some degree the burden caused by the necessity of caring for people on
relief.
A further aspect of the problem of redemption arises out of the provision for payment of in-
terest on war savings bonds. These bonds, as is well known, bear no interest in case they are
redeemed within a year of the date of issue and bear a very low rate if redeemed at any time
up to five years. In case a bond is redeemed in one year or less, the net effect is that the Treas-
ury has borrowed on short term without interest; if redemption takes place within six and a half
years of issue the rate of interest is a little over i percent. While cost of handling may outweigh
the saving on interest, it is nevertheless important to recognize this aspect of early redemption.
Finally, to the extent that the bonds are held to maturity the government is spared the neces-
sity of making any interest payments until xo years from date of issue. This deferment of in-
terest charges is of obvious advantage to a country at war; it may help to offset other features of
the bonds which are more open to objection.
4'bonds, and the feature that bears most closely upon problems of money
supply and price movements, has to do with the effect of their ultimate
repayment, whether by early redemption or otherwise. Much of the recent
literature on fiscal policy and particularly on deficit financing assumes that
an expansion in government debt to be inflationary and a reduction
to be deflationary. Some writers have gone so far as to conclude that any
substantial reduction in national debt is virtually precluded because of the
deflationary consequences that could be expected to follow. This reasoning
is based on two principal assumptions, first, that repayment of debt held
by the banks would tend toward the destruction of demand deposits and,
secondly, that it would restrict consumer expenditures. In the case of war
savings bonds, which are held chiefly by people in the lower-income brackets,
neither of these assumptions can be accepted as valid. Discharge of these
obligations would entail no destruction of demand deposits, such as would
follow payment of debt held by banks.; and a transfer of funds, such as would
occur if they were paid out of taxation, would largely be to individuals
with a high propensity to consume so that the effect would probably be
expansionist.33 With respect to war savings bonds, then, there is considerably
less danger than has frequently been alleged that a postwar reduction of
government debt would exert a depressive influence. It might, in fact, have
the opposite effect. The spenders-for-recovery and the orthodox budget-
balancers may be able, through the medium of war savings to meet
on common ground.
In this respect war savings bonds closely resemble the assets accumulated
under a system of compulsory savings. One of the principal arguments
advanced in support of compulsory savings is that they would provide a
back-log of potential purchasing power for use in the event of a postwar
decline in business. The same end may be served by war savings bonds.
IN CONCLUSION
The increase in circulating medium that has occurred in recent years raises
questions as to the future of Federal Reserve policy.34 The growth in cir-
culation means that the Reserve System, in pursuing policies designed to
influence the volume of credit, would have to conduct operations on a much
larger scale in order to effect the same relative change in bank credit out-
standing. If in the meantime changes had been introduced in reserve require-
88Becauseof the relatively high propensity to consume of holders of war savings bonds, the
general effect of their redemption is likely to be expansionist under any circumstances. If the
funds for redemption were obtained by new borrowing from banks theeffect would be
especially so.
34Theeffects of the war on the Federal Reserve System will be discussed in detail in a com-
panion study in this series.
42